Reducing the administrative expenditures as source for increasing the efficiency of local governance under conditions of the financial crisis by Matei, Ani & Matei, Lucica
www.ssoar.info
Reducing the administrative expenditures as
source for increasing the efficiency of local
governance under conditions of the financial crisis
Matei, Ani; Matei, Lucica
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Konferenzbeitrag / conference paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Matei, A., & Matei, L. (2010). Reducing the administrative expenditures as source for increasing the efficiency of
local governance under conditions of the financial crisis.. Xiamen, China. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-119152
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reducing the administrative expenditures as source for increasing the 
efficiency of local governance under conditions of the financial crisis 
 
 
                                                                              
Prof. Dr. Ani Matei* 
Prof. Dr. Lucica Matei** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Prof.Dr. Ani Matei, Faculty of Public Administration, National School of Political Studies and Public 
Administration, Bucharest, Romania 
** Prof.Dr. Lucica Matei, Faculty of Public Administration, National School of Political Studies and Public 
Administration, Bucharest, Romania 
 
 2
Introduction  
The period we are going through in recent years is marked, economically speaking, by 
financial crisis effects. These effects, felt in different proportions by each world state, 
overlapped other old economic processes that focus on bureaucracy high costs, costs that 
affect the economic efficiency both in private sector and in public one. Evans and Rauch 
(1999) established the direct connection between the bureaucracy quality and economic 
development. 
The measurement instruments kept in mind the so called “Weberianess scale” (Evans and 
Rauch, 1999, 761-762) made after bureaucracy principles declared by Weber ([1904-1911], 
1968). 
The evolutions specific to contemporary period lead to regulations and obligations abundance 
that highly affect economic results, especially in the private sector. In this context, numerous 
states such as USA, Netherlands, Germany, UK, Australia, Denmark, Sweden, Norway etc. 
and European and international organisations. European Union, OECD, World Bank etc. 
established methodological structures and activation system in order to reduce costs, 
especially for private firms intended to cover some informational obligations imposed by 
national or cross-national state legislation. Identified by the “administrative burden” name, 
these costs were evaluated in the best projects aiming to reduce them. They are the object of 
some professional networks and their coverage area is getting larger. We mention here SCM 
Network comprising over 24 states and organisations. Its main objective is the dissemination 
and development of cooperation itself regarding the administrative burdens reduction.  
The strong connections between public and private sectors currently sustained and developed 
by public economies, and extended area of the New Public Management determine the 
necessity of public sector preoccupation for administrative costs reduction, including 
administrative burden. This was imposed also by the financial crisis. Most of the world states 
reality shows preoccupations in the two directions previously mentioned and the elaboration 
of new aggregated economic mechanisms capable to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness 
of administrative costs reduction strategies. When local and central governments aim to 
maintain a certain level of production, the economic mechanisms that may best sustain and 
describe the strategic objectives are those of production factors substitution. Economic 
analyses emerged from here may offer the necessary information to fulfil the objective of 
administrative costs reduction referred to reduction levels, economic structure etc. 
The proposed research objectives keep in mind to fundament new modalities to approach 
economic processes related to administrative costs reduction policies and strategies, and to 
decrease the financial crisis effects. The main hypotheses refer to: 
 extending administrative costs reduction topic in public sector; 
 integrating the mechanisms of sustaining production factor and the model of 
production functions in the explanatory step that assures the economic support for 
politics and mentioned structures; 
 evaluating local government efficiency in the actual conditions and applying some 
concrete measures to reduce the administrative costs. 
The approached methodology comprises both descriptive and bibliographic administrative 
and economic analyses, and certain statistic data analysis instruments.    
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Chapter I Reducing the administrative costs: programs and mechanisms         
 
I.1. The general conceptual framework 
 
For the public sector the field literature reveals a certain specificity regarding the 
expenditures’ efficiency. Thereby, Stiglitz (2000, 205) presents explanations of inefficiency 
in the public sector (Stiglitz 2000, p. 205), that refer to the organizational and individual 
differences, among which: the role of political concerns, absence of competition, absence of 
incentive pay, difficulty of reducing the staff, as well as the pursuit of bureaucratic objectives 
– maximizing the size of organization. Similar analyses can be found in Bailey (2002), 
Connolly and Munro (1999) or Matei (2003). With regard to the structure of the governmental 
expenditures, for the OECD countries, for example, this comprises: government consumption 
(20-25%), transfer payments (15-18%), subsidies (2-4%), interest paid (7-8%) and capital 
expenditure (2-4%). By analyzing the weight of the public expenditures in the GDP, Connolly 
and Munro (1999, 320-330) reconfirm their growth tendency in accordance with Wagner’s 
Law, as well as in the theories regarding “fiscal illusion” or Baumol Effect (Connolly and 
Munro 1999, p. 14-15; Andrei, Matei, Stancu and Andrei 2009, 320-330). For Romania, 
Andrei, Matei, Stancu and Andrei (2009) test the validity of Wagner’s Law for the aggregated 
governmental expenditures, the average elasticity being non-linear and top-heavy.  
Public expenditure represents “the ensemble of annual expenditure with public nature of a 
country, financed on the basis of public budgetary resources” (Dobrotă 1999, 98). In fact, 
public expenditure reflects the political choices of the Government, representing costs of the 
elements of economic policy aiming to deliver public goods. These costs relate to delivering 
goods through the budget of the public sector or represent expenditure in the private sector, 
induced by regulations and laws made by the public sector.  
What we called in the introduction the administrative burden of private companies can be 
framed in this second category of expenditure. The costs from the first category are in fact 
public expenditure, as such, of which a part represents the costs of bureaucracy in any public 
administration. In an extended meaning for the administrative burden, the costs of 
bureaucracy are in this category for a public administration. 
In the structure of the national or local budgets we find: 
 Exhaustive public expenditure focused on procurement of goods and services (for 
example: labour, consumables) and capital goods (for example: investments of the 
public sector in streets, schools, hospitals); 
 Transfer public expenditure, such as public expenditure for pensions, subsidies, 
interests, unemployment allowances. 
In the general context of the public expenditures, a series of concepts are introduced and used, 
which are important for the analysis we are carrying out. Thus, in accordance with the 
International Standard Cost Model Manual and the EU Standard Cost Model Methodology 
(EU SCM) we will have (EU, 2006, 1): 
 Administrative costs (AC) are defined by SCM as the costs of administrative activities 
that businesses are required to conduct in order to comply with the information 
obligations that are imposed through regulation(DTF, 2007, 4). 
 Information is to be explained in a broad sense, i.e. including costs of labelling, 
reporting, monitoring and assessment needed to provide the information and 
registration. In some cases, the information has to be transferred to public authorities 
in public parties. In others, it only has to be available for inspection or supply on 
request. 
 An important distinction must be made between information that would be collected 
by businesses even in the absence of the legislation and information that would not be 
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collected without the legal provisions. The costs induced by the latter are called 
administrative burdens (AB). Some of the administrative burdens are necessary if the 
underlying objectives of the legislation and prescribed level of protection defined in 
the Treaties are to be met effectively; for instance where information is needed to 
make market transparent. But there are also many cases where burdens can be 
streamlined and reduced without affecting the underlying objectives as such – the 
latter burdens are clearly unnecessary (DTF, 2007, 4). The administrative burdens are 
that part of the administrative costs which are only incurred as a result of the 
regulations. Such costs are called incremental costs because, in the absence of 
regulation, they would not be incurred. Conversely, the business as usual (BAU) costs 
are the costs of the activities which businesses would continue to carry out even if the 
regulatory requirements were removed. 
 
  
or, AC = BUC + AB. 
 
BUC’s costs are not considered in a baseline measurement because the reductions in 
regulatory requirements that are considered businesses’ usual activities will not result in 
actual reductions in business costs because businesses will continue to incur the costs meet 
their own needs. Reducing the costs for business requires that the focus be on administrative 
burden. 
Third-party information obligation costs arise from regulation requiring business to provide 
information to third parties, such as employees or consumers. The Netherlands and Denmark 
included third-party information obligation costs in their SCM baseline measurement. 
However, the UK Standard Cost Model Manual (BRE, 2005) states that third-party costs are 
excluded from the baseline. 
DTF (2007, 5) describes a scheme intending to determine the share of different administrative 
costs categories in GDP. 
 
 
 
SCM 
Baseline 
Measurement 
 
 
- 
 
Business as 
Usual Costs 
(BUC) 
 
 
- 
 
 
=
 
Administrative 
Burden as a % 
of GDP 
 
3rd Party 
Information  
Obligation 
Costs 
Source: DTF (2007, 5) 
Administrative Cost 
Source: DTF(2007, 4) 
Business as Usual Cost Administrative Burden = +
 
Concrete estimations extracted from different strategic documents are illustrative also. 
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Table I.1. Estimated administrative costs, structure and percentage of GDP (DTF, 2007, 6) 
 
Country Measured 
Administrative Costs 
Estimated 
Administrative 
Burden (or moving 
BUC) 
Estimated 
Administrative 
Burden (excl. 3rd 
party costs ) 
United Kingdom 2.5 % 1.6 % 1.0% 
The Netherlands 3.6 % 2.3 % 1.4 % 
Denmark 2.2 % 1.4 % 0.9 % 
Czech Republic 3.0 % 1.9 % 1.1 % 
 
For the mentioned states it can be observed that the estimated share of administrative burden 
is between 0.9 % - 1.04% from GDP.     
 
 
I.2. EU Policies and Programs for reducing the administrative costs 
 
I.2.1. Better Regulation Program 
 
Regulation, a phenomenon happening at local, national or international level, is a mean to 
answer the challenges triggered by the free movement of goods, services, people and capital, 
serving several purposes: to protect health by ensuring food safety, to protect the environment 
by setting air and water quality standards, to set rules for companies competing in the 
marketplace to create a level playing field.  
The European Commission launched a ‘Better Regulation’ program 2002 to simplify and 
generally improve the regulatory environment. It is designed to cut red tape, improve the 
quality of regulation and design better laws for consumers and businesses alike. 
The Better Regulation program included a mix of different actions: 
- introducing a system for assessing the impact assessment and improving the design 
improvement of major Commission proposals; 
- implementing a program of simplification of existing legislation; 
- testing Commission proposals still being looked at by the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament, to see whether they should be withdrawn; 
- factoring consultation into all Commission initiatives; 
- looking at alternatives to laws and regulations (such as self-regulation, or co-regulation by 
the legislator and interested parties). 
The Commission’s ongoing effort - to regulate better - results in examining administrative 
costs in specific policy areas. The EC set out a method for measuring administrative costs (the 
EU’s net administrative cost model), inspired by best practice in the Member States, such as 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
 
Alternatives to regulation, which can be more cost efficient and effective ways to address 
certain policy objectives than the classic legal tools, are: 
- Co-regulation –  entrusting the achievement of the goals set out in law, for example to the 
social partners or to non-governmental organizations  
- Self-regulation - voluntary agreements between private bodies to deal with their own 
problems by taking mutual actions; 
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On 23 March 2005, the European Council requested “the Commission and the Council to 
consider a common methodology for measuring administrative burdens with the aim of 
reaching an agreement by the end of 2005”.  
On 16 March 2006 the Commission's Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and 
Jobs in the European Union included, as a companion Staff Working Paper, a detailed outline 
of a possible “EU Net Administrative Cost Model” (EC, 2005) based on Standard Cost 
Model. 
The outline of an EU Net Administrative Cost Model was amended and refined through a 
pilot phase carried out from April to September 2005 that led the Commission to present a 
revised methodology, also called the "EU SCM" (COM, 2005). The Commission listed a 
number of possible improvements to the EU SCM, while making clear that such optimization 
was no precondition for its application. An operational manual for applying the model was 
included on 15 March 2006 in the Impact Assessment guidelines and translated in all EU 
official languages to ease methodological convergence. The EU SCM has been applied in a 
number of published or upcoming Impact Assessments to ensure that any administrative 
burdens generated by new legislation are justified and minimized. Though they share a 
common methodology, the administrative burden reducing exercise is different from normal 
Impact Assessment practice. This administrative burden exercise aims to provide a 
comprehensive ex-post measurement of legislation in a policy area for all levels of legislation 
and then subsequent identification of reduction targets. Impact assessment, on the other hand, 
measures all the costs and benefits of available policy options, while the administrative 
burden methodology is only a partial measurement tool which is to be applied proportionately 
and used only in assessing ex-ante impacts of proposed changes of legislation (marginal 
approach). 
 
I.2.2. Action Program to Reduce the Administrative Burden 
 
In November 2006, the Commission proposed launching an ambitious Action Program to 
reduce the administrative burden of existing regulation in the EU. As part of this, the 
Commission proposed that the 2007 Spring European Council had to fix a reduction target of 
25 %, to be achieved jointly by the EU and Member States by 2012. This underlines the 
Commission’s commitment to Better Regulation as part of the “Growth and Jobs” strategy. 
The joint target - to reduce administrative burdens by 25 % in 2012 - covers Community 
legislation as well as national regulatory measures. Achieving this objective could lead to an 
increase in the level of EU GDP of approximately 1.4% or € 150 billion in the medium term 
(Gelauff and Lejour, 2005). 
The mentioned document also assesses the administrative costs of the EU Member States that 
vary between 6.8% (in Greece (GR), Hungary (HU) and RE (Baltic States, Malta and 
Cyprus)) and 1.5% (United Kingdom (UK), Finland (FI) or Sweden (SE)), the EU average 
being of 3.5% (the percentages refer to GDP)(COM(2006)). The prospects of reducing with 
25% the administrative costs will lead to a reduction by 1.3% of their weight in GDP, on 
average for EU.  
 
I.3. OECD. The costs of financial and administrative regulation 
 
Regulation has a number of consequences for businesses. Administrative costs are only one 
type of costs that regulation can entail. The figure below illustrates the different types of costs 
that regulation can impose on businesses.  
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Long term 
structural costs 
Compliance costs 
Indirect financial 
costs 
(substantive 
competence costs) 
Administrative 
costs 
 
Source: OECD (2010, 10)
Direct financial 
costs 
 
The cost of regulation to businesses 
 
Direct financial costs are the result of a concrete and direct obligation to transfer a sum of 
money to the Government or the competent authority. These costs are therefore not related to 
a need for information on the part of the Government. Such costs include administrative 
charges, taxes, etc. For example, the fees for applying for a permit would be a financial cost 
of the regulation.  
 
Compliance costs are all the costs of complying with regulation, with the exception of direct 
financial costs and long term structural consequences. In the context of the Standard Cost 
Model, these can be divided into ‘substantive compliance costs’ and ‘administrative costs’. 
Examples of substantive compliance costs include:  
1. filters in accordance with environmental requirements; 
2. physical facilities in compliance with working conditions’ regulations.  
Examples of administrative costs include:  
1. documentation of the installation of a filter; 
2. an annual report on working conditions.  
 
Administrative burdens are the part of administrative costs that businesses sustain simply 
because of requirements. The administrative burdens are thus a subset of the administrative 
costs in that the administrative costs also encompass the administrative activities that 
businesses will continue to conduct if the regulations were removed.  
 
I.4. Standard Cost Model (SCM) 
 
SCM Network comprises for the time being over 24 states and organizations, and recently 
also Romania. In fact, for Romania, the “Strategy for better regulation at central government 
level, 2008 – 2013” comprises, as priorities on medium term, “preliminary analysis of the 
issue of administrative burden, development of a general methodology to assess the 
administrative costs and to elaborate a concrete action plan in order to implement the 
Standard Administrative Cost Model”. 
There are measurement/ estimating methodologies for quantifying the administrative burden 
imposed by tax regulations: 
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 standard measurement methodology, such as what has become known as the SCM, which 
consists of 4 stages: 
o Information obligations (IO) for each tax are specified (IO are the obligations 
arising from regulation to provide information and data to the public sector or 
third parties. An IO does not necessarily mean that information has to be 
transferred to the public authority or private persons, but may include a duty to 
have information available for inspection or supply on request. A regulation 
may contain many IOs); 
o The data requirements applicable to each information obligation are identified; 
o The administrative requirements are established;  
o Cost parameters (i.e. price, time and quantity) for each administrative activity 
are collected: 
 Price consists of a tariff, wage costs plus overhead for administrative 
activities done internally or hourly cost for external service providers;  
 Time, the amount of time required to complete the administrative 
activity;  
 Quantity comprises of the size of the population of businesses affected 
and the frequency that the activity must be completed each year; 
SCM formula: 
Cost per administrative activity (or per data requirement)= Price x Time x Quantity  
(population x frequency) 
 
 tailor-made approach, such as those as employed by the New Zeeland and Swedish 
revenue authorities when quantifying the administrative burden of their respective VAT 
systems. 
 
Taxes that contribute most to overall administrative burdens: 
 Personal income; 
 Social contributions - received largely from employers in the form of withholdings 
from employees’ wages - is administered by separate social security agencies (in 
some countries, multiple agencies), while in other countries (e.g. Finland, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and UK) it has been integrated with the collection of 
personal income tax administered by the main revenue body; 
 Corporate; 
 Value Added Tax (VAT) - imposes the most significant level of burden (in absolute 
terms) of any tax in most countries; 
 Excise. 
Integrating the collection of social contributions and personal tax collections should trigger a 
reduction in the administrative burden of businesses, “placing responsibility for collection (of 
social contributions) with the tax administration can also significantly reduce compliance 
costs for employers, with less paperwork as a result of common forms and book-keeping 
systems, and a common audit program covering income, VAT and payroll taxes, and social 
contributions based on income and payrolls. The increasing use of Internet-based electronic 
filing and payment systems with the tax administration also lowers taxpayers’ and 
contributors’ compliance costs. This simplification can also improve the accuracy of 
calculations made by employers and therefore compliance levels”(IMF, 2004). 
SCM Network disseminates and makes compatible the good practices from administrative 
costs decreasing domain. Table I.2 presents a synthesis of the main initiatives and proposals 
assumed by national governments. 
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Table I.2. Synthesis of initiatives and proposals for cost reduction  
Country Period/Term Objective Targeted area Comments 
Australia 2006-2012 25 % Businesses and not 
for profit 
- Up to July 2011 was 
provided  a 256 mil $  
decrease 
- In September 2009 the 
target was revised to 
500 mil $ until July 
2012(including 
substantive 
compliance and delay 
costs)   
Austria 2007-2012 25 % - Ministries 
- Austrian 
businesses 
- Global evaluation – 1 
billion EUR 
- Two phase reduction: 
2010 for national 
induced burdens and 
2012 for EU induced 
burdens 
Belgium 2007-2012 17-33 % Organizations from 
6 governmental 
domains 
- Global evaluation – 
61.120.467 EUR 
- Reduction is made by 
projects 
implementation 
simplification   
Czech 
Republic 
2005-2010 20 % Businesses 
organizations 
In 2008, the Government 
reconfirms the 2005 
objective 
Denmark  2001-2012 25 % - Businesses 
organizations 
- 15 ministries 
with attribution 
in business 
regulation 
- The initial target of 15 
% was recalculated in 
2002 up to 25 % 
- E-government 
strategies keep in 
mind business but also 
public authorities 
reductions 
France 2006-2012 25 % Business 
organizations 
3 % of GDP (60 billions 
EUR) 
Germany 2006-2012 25 % - Businesses 
organizations 
- Citizens 
- Public 
administration 
- In 2009 the Federal 
Government extended 
the topic reducing 
administrative costs 
for public 
administration and 
citizens 
Italy 2008-2012 2012 Business 
organizations 
The objectives were set 
up in accordance with 
Lisbon Strategy and 
European Target 
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Netherlands 2002-2007 25 % Business 
organizations 
In 2007, the 
administrative burdens for 
business were represented 
by 9,3 billion EUR, the 
equivalent of 1,7% of 
GDP and comes, in equal 
parts, from national and 
European legislation 
Poland 2010 25 % Business and public 
organizations 
Domains like 
environment, spatial 
planning, tourist services, 
labour law, business 
activity law, social 
security were targeted 
Spain 2008-2012 30 % - Businesses 
organizations 
- Citizens 
- It will increase by 1.4 
% of GDP 
- 10 ministries are 
targeted  
UK 2005-2015 25 % - Businesses 
organizations 
- Policy costs 
- The third sector 
 
- In the first phase, 
2005-2010, the target 
was a reduction 
evaluated to 3.3 
billion £  
- In 2009 the Govern 
established new 
objectives for 2010-
2015 
Source: SCM Network. http://www.administrative-burdens.com 
 
The synthesis proves the preoccupation of the majority of European states, and also from 
other continents, in order to reduce the administrative costs. We refer to administrative costs 
because many states focus their governmental efforts towards them, overcoming the strict 
objective of administrative burden. 
 
I.5. World Bank. Economic Benefits for Administrative Reform 
 
The World Bank has developed a series of administrative reform projects that aimed at 
reducing the administrative and compliance costs (W.B., 2007). 
These projects benefit society if they reduce administrative and compliance costs. 
Macroeconomic benefits - Trade liberalization will involve a loss in trade tax revenue that can 
be substituted with an increase in the domestic tax revenues. 
Reduction in administrative costs of collecting the taxes – The modernization of tax 
administration should lead to lower costs per amount of revenue raised as: 
i. the tax administration is streamlined; 
ii. tax officials are better trained; 
iii. tax payers become more compliant as a result of enhanced tax payer education, and 
the establishment of taxpayer support centers, process simplification, and improved 
automation; 
iv. a simpler tax policy results.  
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Reduction in compliance cost for the taxpayer - These costs, which tend to be higher than the 
cost of administering the tax itself, include the cost individuals and enterprises incur in 
preparing their tax declaration, and dealing with tax audits (Evans, 2003) (in-house costs, 
bribes). 
Support trade liberalization - These benefits have been estimated for 1997–2015 at $500 
billion (1997 dollars), three-quarters of which would result from the dismantling trade barriers 
in low- and middle- income countries(W.B., 2002). 
Reduction in distortions of the present tax regime - strengthening the capacity of the tax 
administration. 
 
Chapter II The Administrative Costs in the Public Sector 
 
II.1. An extension of the conceptual framework 
 
The extension of this issue towards the public sector will lead to an extension of the content 
of the administrative burden to include „compliance costs for enterprises, services and 
citizens, including administrative and bureaucratic (operational) costs as well as capital 
costs”(SCM, 2005). 
Consequently, the administrative costs in the public sector comprise, mainly, the costs for 
purchasing goods and support services for bureaucracy, as well as payments of some charges 
etc. The model that will be presented follows the ideas from Matei (2008), and it was used for 
assessing the public sector performance (Matei 2008, 69-73) or substantiating the marketing 
strategies under the reduction of the administrative costs (Matei, Matei and Dinu 2009, 17-
27).  
The weight of public expenditure is different and depends on the development level of the 
public or of the private sector. Reported to the latter, the administrative burden of the public 
sector has a non linear evolution. From this perspective it is worth mentioning the models 
formulated by Musqrave (1974) and Rostow (1960), stating that in the earlier stages of 
growth and economic development, investments in the public sector are high, providing the 
core social infrastructure. The purpose of these investments is to help economy to reach 
higher development stages, where, although the state will continue investments, their role will 
be to complete the private investments. The conclusions of the two economists are relevant 
also for the evolution of the administrative costs, both in the public and private sector: 
 While total investments increase as proportion from GDP growth, the relative share of 
the public sector decreases (Musqrave, 1974, 35). 
 When economy reaches the maturity stage, the mix of public expenditure will be 
oriented from the expenditure for infrastructure to expenditure for education, health 
and welfare services (Rostow, 1960, 9 – 10). 
Therefore, if we take into calculation, the total administrative costs (ACtot) obtained by 
summing up those from public and private sector: 
privatepublictot ACACAC         (II.1) 
it will have the following characteristics: 
 totAC  can be considered constant, for certain periods of economic development; 
 private  vary in time; public ACandAC
 between  there is bidirectional transfer due to effects of 
dislocation between public and private expenditure, specific for different periods of 
economic and social development. 
privatepublic ACandAC
The above assertions are based on Peacock-Wiseman analyses, stating that „Governments 
have the trend to spend more money and the citizens do not wish to pay many taxes. 
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Consequently, the Governments should take into consideration the wishes of their citizens” 
(Payne, Ewing, Mohammadi, 2006, 37).  
In this context, it occurs the so called effect of dislocation, namely the public expenditure 
dislocates the private expenditure in certain periods, such as crises periods. 
By using (I.1) and (II.1) we obtain:  privatpublicprivatpublic ABABconstBUCBUC  .     (II.2) 
Which lead us to the idea that, at least on a macroeconomic level, the customary costs of the 
public and private affairs depend directly on the administrative burden.  
 
II.2.  Public expenditures evolution during financial crisis  
II.2.1 OECD analyses 
In the last half century specialized literature increased its concerning towards public 
expenditures evaluation directly related to economical performance. Saunders (1985) analyzes 
public expenditures size and its impact on GDP in OECD states. What characterizes the 
period 1960-1981 was the existence of budget deficits on a large scale in the mid ‘70s after a 
strong public expenses increase. Recently, Olugbenga (2009) explores the Wagnerian-
Keynesian debate over the direction of the causal relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth, not only in developed countries but in developing ones 
also. This exploration is made by examining the relations between dynamic properties of 
public expenditures and economic growth for 30 OECD countries during 1970-2005. 
In fact, OECD preoccupation towards closely monitoring public expenses, towards the 
expenditures allocation mechanism and the way they contribute to attain a public policy goal 
are well known. 
Some data are relevant for the financial crisis period. For Germany the conclusion in OECD 
(2010a, Ch.3) is that public finances quickly decline. To be more concrete, it is thought that 
after a period in which general budget deficit was reduced to a level close to equilibrium (in 
2007 and 2008), in 2009 it substantially increased. For 2010 it reaches over 5% of GDP. 
Deficit reduction method should be reducing public expenditures through an ambitious 
program. “In reducing the expenses, improving the public administrative effectiveness should 
have priority since this would allow expenses reduction without decreasing services’ quality 
and availability”. 
For Poland, OECD (2010b, Ch.1) presents another perspective: “Poland registered in 2009 the 
best performance of GDP increase among the OECD countries”. Although the crisis effects 
were felt from the adaptation of European currency point of view, the public institutions 
empowerment remains an essential problem of this country. 
For Norway, OECD (2010c, Ch.1) observes a strong resistance towards crisis effects. 
Nevertheless, after the crisis it is necessary a macro-prudential approach in order to 
coordinate with other European and international institutions. It is also mentioned (OECD, 
2010c, ch.2) “the existence of an unexploited potential for providing efficient public services 
on lower prices, especially in municipal services, such as education, health and even fiscal 
expenditures”. 
Bearing in mind the high recession level in Hungary, OECD (2010d, ch.1) says that “the crisis 
was a catalyst for applying decisive structural reforms”. The same source, in Chapter 3 talks 
about “enhancing financial stability through better regulation”. 
Obviously, OECD comprised 30 states fundamental analysis of recent data concerning the 
financial crisis effects on public expenditures. These offer us the input for sustaining the main 
idea of this paper: the necessity for an integrated approach on policies and statistics for      
public administrative costs and expenditures reduction in times of financial crisis.  
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II.2.2 Public budgets’ contraction 
In order to continue the shortly presented analyses from OECD studies we shall consequently 
present some statistic data concerning the financial equilibriums at governmental level. The 
presented period, 1995-2011 highlights cyclical evolution. Moreover, after 2008, 2009 a new 
cycle of budget deficit or surpluses measurement would occur and it would be characterized 
by an accentuated increase/decrease. 
On account of OECD (2010e), Annex 1 presents, in percents, the evolution of national 
budgets including a foresight for 2010 and 2011. 
A more detailed analysis of national tendencies highlights a number of particularities. These 
are resulted also from the calculation of Pearson correlation coefficient for the analyzed 
interval (Annex 2). 
For most of the OECD states the correlations intensity is strong, generally overcoming the 
value of 0.6. The evolution under the correlation mean of most of the OECD states can be 
found in Czech Republic, Switzerland, Slovakia or Japan. 
Negative correlations are being highlighted in the Hungary case or Slovakia.  
It is also interesting the correlation with the mean at OECD level or EURO zone. The proven 
overtime emergence of the economy in most of the OECD states is being underlined at high 
correlation level. Once more, Hungary and Slovakia are the exceptions since they have 
negative correlation both with OECD and also with Euro zone mean. Japan has positive 
correlation just under the mean of the other OECD states. 
A general analysis of mentioned states’ budget evolution emphasizes a pronounced 
contraction of national budget that is visible mainly starting with 2008 and even more in 
2009.  
In figure 2 the budgets contraction phenomenon is very evocative: 
  
      Figure 1 – Budgets evolution during 1995-2011 
  
Most states, both from OECD and also others, have public expenditure reduction strategies in 
a developing phase. Therefore, deficits are supposed to decrease and their economies to 
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confirm, starting with 2011, positive evolutions. These strategies correlate with older 
administrative cost reduction strategies. Hence, the extension of administrative cost reduction 
subject towards public sector and integrated approach of private and public sector may lead to 
a more realistic image of economic efficiency maintenance and GDP increased scenarios.     
 
Chapter III Administrative expenditures reduction impact on local government 
efficiency 
 
The financial crisis determined the overlapping of superposition effects of administrative 
expenditures reduction with overcoming the financial crisis strategies that aim to decrease 
public expenditures. 
In both of the situations, the governmental objectives focused on those concerning the growth 
of economic efficiency. Or, like in the case of crisis situation, to preserve these levels for a 
convenient period of time to cover the crisis. 
A more profound economic analysis emphasizes applicable economic mechanism that may 
explain and substantiate the processes that characterize crisis times. 
 
III.1 A new explanatory model of production factors substitution during financial crisis    
 
Specialized literature shows new approaches towards production factors substitution aiming 
to state economical models that describe, closer to reality, different economic processes 
specific to the present days. 
In this context Arow, Chenery, Minhas and Solow(1961), Klump and Grandville (2000), 
Karagianis, Palivos and Papageorgiou (2004), Lovell (1973), Sato and Hoffman (1968), 
Zaman and Goschin (2007) et al. focus especially on work and capital production factors, the 
actual approaches incorporating technological progress evolutions that, on the one hand 
determine “the growth of factors consumption” and, on the other hand, caused “the growth of 
complex highly qualified work” and “the growth of highly qualified work consumption and 
the poorly qualified work saving/replacement” completed with “the capital consumption at 
high technological level ”(Zaman and Goschin, 2007, 3-4). 
These tendencies generate significant changes in substitution elasticity of different production 
factors depending on the one hand on the level of social-economical development and, on the 
other, on factors such as market globalization, connectivity and interdependences and 
interoperability growth in world economy as a result of information and communication 
technology extension, new managerial approaches and best practices generalizations and 
market emergence growth etc. 
Nowadays (Zestos (1996), Klump (2005),  Karagianis et al. (2004)) the production factors 
substitution is analyzed from its direct nature point of view-referring to one factors type 
replacement with other factors with another, or its indirect one – several production factors 
replacement with other factors with different functions but complementary to productive 
processes.  
Crisis periods emphasize the connection between substitution processes of production factors 
and technological progress. The objectivity of such a connection is being currently offered by 
the restrictive characteristic of natural resources, by the necessity to fight pollution at local 
and global level and, in general, the “global problems” effects on humankind. The financial 
crises add to these determinations other elements decreasing the financial resources. 
The need for sustainability growth under economic, social and environmental aspects and in 
general for the growth/conservation of production and consumption models efficiency or eco-
efficiency overlaps with objectives commonly reachable in most of the strategies for financial 
crisis effects reduction. 
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Nevertheless, indirect substitution that is specific for financial crisis times is equivalent with 
saving in order to maintain and/or to consolidate economic equilibriums. At the present time 
the most important substitution between capital and work refers to information and 
communication technology (TIC). According to Zaman and Goschin (2007) TIC becomes a 
real capital with modernization significance, “restructuring factors of a significant part of 
traditional work capital in all social departments as a result of positive externalities created 
especially in costs reduction domain”(Zaman and Goschin, 2007, 4-5). 
The continuous growth of workforce qualification, the production “dematerialization” or the 
corporate management extension in public sector represent as many restructuring and 
sustaining factors as production factors substitutions. 
Administrative costs or public expenditures reduction policies and strategies determine 
changes in the mechanisms of production factors substitution. 
Arrow et al. (1961), Miller (2008), Sato (1967), Morishima (1967), Matei (2008) show 
theoretical and methodological instruments for macroeconomic analysis of production factors 
substitution and Cobb-Douglas production functions with their variants CES (Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution) and VES (Variable Elasticity of Substitution). 
As it is known, the production functions are nonlinear expression of production factors capital 
and work that by using the same instruments (EC, 2009, 24-25) analyzes the productivity gap 
sources between UE and USA. Getting inspired from Moore’s (2008) papers, the mentioned 
report considers the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
    1kEHQA L  
where represents GDP, E is employment in persons, H is average hours worked,  is the 
indicator of the quality of the labour input, K is capital input, A is total factor productivity and 
, 1-  is the production elasticity of labour, respectively capital. This laborious study’s 
conclusions identify, among others, as the cause of growth rate disparity between UE and 
USA (by approximately 0.8% lower than the 1995-2006 period): demographic aspects, a 
lower work productivity growth, fewer work hours although the initial work education 
improved more in the UE. To this it can be added or not, the technical progress. Production 
functions show production (output) maxim contribution that can be obtained starting from a 
series of production factors (input) and allow to define and to measure some economic effects 
related to factors’ yield and to possible substitution between: scale elasticity, factors elasticity, 
substitution elasticity or, if the case, technology progress rate. We shall focus in our analysis 
on CES and Cobb-Douglas production factors without technical progress. 
 LQ
According to Andrei and Bourbonnais (2008, 180-184) nonlinear model represented by CES 
is different based on:  
 
 
 
                                                                                   III.1  tttt eLK      )1( 
 
where: 
- Υt – the variable that modifies the outputs from the system 
- kt – fix capital, Lt – human capital 
- γ, δ, μ, θ – models’ parameters 
- εt – residual variable with N repartition N (0, σ2) 
 
CES model parameters significances are:  
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 γ > 0 – the parameter of production process efficiency 
 δ  (0, 1) – is known as the parameter of production process distribution 
 μ > 0 – scale parameter for the process 
 θ ≥ -1 – parameter for the two process factors substitution 
 
Two properties are relevant for the CES function: 
- production factors substitution elasticity is determined by θ substitution parameter, the 
relation being : 
                                           1
1e                                                             III.2 
Usually, an improper elasticity fraction of production factors substitution means greater 
opportunities to combine them optimally. On the contrary, a proper elasticity fraction shows 
rigidity in the composing variety of production factors, as well as consequence delay and 
absorption incapacity of production factors and investment valorization in technological 
progress.  
- scale efficiency is determined through μ parameter. The scale yield of production 
factors represents the sum of production factors efficiency, each efficiency being equal 
to the ratio between factors marginal productivity and mean productivity.     
If μ  (0,1) production function has a descending scale efficiency. If μ > 1 we have an 
ascending function of scale performance. For μ = 1 the scale efficiency is constant. 

Cobb-Douglas production function is a particular CES case. The expression of Cobb-Douglas 
function is:  
t
ttt eLAKY
                                                             III.3 
 
Υt , Kt, Lt have the significance mentioned earlier and A, α, β represent the real parameters in 
εt , the residual variable.  
To be more precise, α will represent partial elasticity of production related to fix capital eK, 
and β –of partial elasticity of productivity related to human capital (eL). Scale elasticity equals 
the sum of two partial elasticity cases. 
 
                                                     LK eee                                                            III.4 
If e < 1, the production process will generate the growth of the outputs in a lower proportion 
than the increase of production factors. If e > 1 the production process generates a greater 
increase of outputs than in the case of production factors. In the case of competition markets, 
the elasticity is a greater than one ratio. 
Therefore, substitution or scale elasticity measures the percentage change in factors 
proportion due to the change in the change of technical substitution marginal rate. 
Substitution elasticity shows the proportional variance of quantitative ratio of resulted factors 
from the proportional variation of marginal rate of technical substitution of one factor related 
to another. In other words, it represents “an ease measure of the variable factor to be 
substituted by another” (Hicks, 1932, 117).      
In the described context, the determination of CES or Cobb-Douglas production factors may 
offer information concerning the aggregation flexibility of the two important production 
factors, work and capital and the capacity to overtake and portray the inclusion level of 
technical progress as the main resource for efficiency and production conservation in crisis 
conditions. 
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III.2 An empirical analysis  
 
Empirical research estimates, in Romania’s case, the Cobb-Douglas production functions 
model using as statistic data: 
- GDP as a measure of output. 
- Gross fix capital formation (GFCF) as an expression of fix capital production factors. 
- Employed population (EMPL) for human capital production factor 
The utilized statistic data are those in Annex 3. Making use of the mentioned data series for 
parameters estimation it was used: 
- Trans-log representation for CES function 
- Linearization through logarithm function for Cobb-Douglas function. 
Therefore, the result is:     307.0014.225.025.025.0625.0 305.0305.1104 eEMPLGFCFGDP                               III.6 
650.64,961.02  FR  
    338.0367.0775.007.8 eEMPLGFCFGDP                                                                     
414.92,957.02  FR  
 
where substitution elasticity becomes: 
- for CES, e=1.33                                                                                                  III.7 
- for Cobb-Douglas model, e=1.142                                                                 
 
In both of the situation the scale performance is ascending and the differences resulted from 
the relative number of utilized statistical data. After calculating CS and CA indicators we can 
conclude that Cobb-Douglass model offers more likely results than CES model. 
Trying to make an evaluation according to the proposed model for the Romanian 
development regions we find the following value for the elasticity of substitution. 
 
No Region e 
1 North-West -2.103
2 Center 1.327
3 North-East -0.125
4 South-East -1.397
5 South-Muntenia 1.165
6 Bucharest-Ilfov 1.965
7 South-West Oltenia -1.143
8 West -0.587
 
Table III.1– The elasticity of production factors substitution accordingly to Romanian 
development regions 
  
The Romanian development regions analysis was made for the statistical data from 2003-
2009. The situation shows strong imbalances, the scale efficiency being ascending in only 3 
regions,  the  others  having a decreasing  aspect, with  the  special  mention  for North-West 
(-2.103), South-East (-1.397) and South-West Oltenia (-1.143). 
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Conclusions 
 
Making use of fundamental economic analysis on production factors substitutions during 
financial crises, determined by strategic measures in order to reduce administrative costs and 
public expenditures offers relevant information concerning public policy-making for national 
and local government in those mentioned periods. 
Zaman and Goschin (2007, 10) highlight the conclusion according to which the mentioned 
analysis “was an important instrument to substantiate decision at micro and macroeconomic 
level when it comes to the policy of raising the efficiency and eco-efficiency, to income 
distribution and to assuring a framework for optimal combination of production factors in 
conditions of globalization and  knowledge-based economy”. 
Production factors elasticity is variable according to which time interval it is being taken into 
consideration. On long term it has the tendency to stabilize at aggregate level. 
Crises impose generally negative jumps, therefore, the stable value of the strategies aiming to 
reduce crisis effects must actually watch for the comeback at the former stabilization and to 
impose a new ascending trend. 
Substitution of production factors due to public expenditures reduction is based on a 
mechanism that takes place in two stages. 
First stage consists of human capital reduction which would lead, under the reallocation in 
production of resulted sums, to the growth of fix productive human capital. In the second 
stage the growth of fix productive capital would determine the workforce growth in private 
sector, workforce with other qualifications and usually better qualified. 
In this mechanism we can see two types of substitution. On the one hand, the substitution of 
human capital /fix capital and on the other, human capital/better qualified human capital. All 
these types of substitution depend, as mentioned in the literature, on their elasticity level. 
Only in the condition of supra-unitary elasticity the described substitutions is preferred. 
Administrative costs reduction strategies overlapping with crisis effects become an important 
mechanism to preserve or to eventually increase the production efficiency during crisis times.  
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Annex 1 
 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech  
Republic 
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea 
Australia 1,000 0,768** 0,893** 0,923** 0,510* 0,835** 0,848** 0,819** 0,612** 0,835** -0,326 0,615** 0,725** 0,784** 0,121 0,466 
Austria 0,768** 1,000 0,804** 0,802** 0,457 0,767** 0,878** 0,775** 0,689** 0,716** -0,109 0,365 0,516* 0,740** 0,318 0,513* 
Belgium 0,893** 0,804** 1,000 0,895** 0,369 0,754** 0,894** 0,885** 0,574* 0,844** -0,246 0,579* 0,766** 0,791** 0,215 0,597* 
Canada 0,923** 0,802** 0,895** 1,000 0,585* 0,876** 0,902** 0,906** 0,734** 0,862** -0,143 0,670** 0,785** 0,848** 0,229 0,598* 
Czech Republic 0,510* 0,457 0,369 0,585* 1,000 0,577* 0,521* 0,351 0,834** 0,362 0,349 0,247 0,171 0,571* 0,293 0,150 
Denmark 0,835** 0,767** 0,754** 0,876** 0,577* 1,000 0,841** 0,785** 0,644** 0,686** -0,242 0,597* 0,615** 0,645** 0,496* 0,569* 
Finland 0,848** 0,878** 0,894** 0,902** 0,521* 0,841** 1,000 0,797** 0,766** 0,721** -0,041 0,425 0,568* 0,840** 0,202 0,539* 
France 0,819** 0,775** 0,885** 0,906** 0,351 0,785** 0,797** 1,000 0,562* 0,917** -0,247 0,700** 0,898** 0,677** 0,273 0,747** 
Germany 0,612** 0,689** 0,574* 0,734** 0,834** 0,644** 0,766** 0,562* 1,000 0,535* 0,374 0,218 0,290 0,814** 0,193 0,304 
Greece 0,835** 0,716** 0,844** 0,862** 0,362 0,686** 0,721** 0,917** 0,535* 1,000 -0,312 0,810** 0,899** 0,687** 0,143 0,679** 
Hungary -0,326 -0,109 -0,246 -0,143 0,349 -0,242 -0,041 -0,247 0,374 -0,312 1,000 -0,446 -0,422 0,123 -0,092 -0,177 
Iceland 0,615** 0,365 0,579* 0,670** 0,247 0,597* 0,425 0,700** 0,218 0,810** -0,446 1,000 0,860** 0,379 0,228 0,637** 
Ireland 0,725** 0,516* 0,766** 0,785** 0,171 0,615** 0,568* 0,898** 0,290 0,899** -0,422 0,860** 1,000 0,484* 0,185 0,727** 
Italy 0,784** 0,740** 0,791** 0,848** 0,571* 0,645** 0,840** 0,677** 0,814** 0,687** 0,123 0,379 0,484* 1,000 0,077 0,410 
Japan 0,121 0,318 0,215 0,229 0,293 0,496* 0,202 0,273 0,193 0,143 -0,092 0,228 0,185 0,077 1,000 0,445 
Korea 0,466 0,513* 0,597* 0,598* 0,150 0,569* 0,539* 0,747** 0,304 0,679** -0,177 0,637** 0,727** 0,410 0,445 1,000 
Luxembourg 0,494* 0,680** 0,694** 0,656** 0,085 0,515* 0,622** 0,853** 0,458 0,731** -0,044 0,471 0,714** 0,578* 0,258 0,716** 
Netherland 0,782** 0,794** 0,742** 0,904** 0,788** 0,804** 0,851** 0,800** 0,914** 0,745** 0,132 0,461 0,573* 0,804** 0,240 0,488* 
New Zeeland 0,628** 0,586* 0,640** 0,620** 0,197 0,783** 0,596* 0,669** 0,215 0,548* -0,547* 0,584* 0,659** 0,249 0,596* 0,600* 
Norway 0,368 0,509* 0,347 0,461 0,626** 0,667** 0,604* 0,245 0,608** 0,188 0,242 0,144 0,022 0,451 0,539* 0,351 
Poland 0,605* 0,572* 0,580* 0,695** 0,361 0,742** 0,584* 0,773** 0,571* 0,706** -0,123 0,585* 0,636** 0,582* 0,462 0,678** 
Portugal 0,744** 0,685** 0,855** 0,749** 0,274 0,610** 0,707** 0,829** 0,515* 0,722** -0,226 0,417 0,722** 0,672** 0,311 0,571* 
Slovak Republic 0,196 0,043 0,050 -0,012 0,033 0,288 -0,003 -0,120 -0,218 -0,155 -0,355 0,018 -0,116 -0,080 0,338 -0,201 
Spain 0,899** 0,743** 0,880** 0,897** 0,420 0,862** 0,814** 0,845** 0,475 0,858** -0,403 0,810** 0,822** 0,648** 0,327 0,645** 
Sweden 0,777** 0,732** 0,705** 0,848** 0,779** 0,821** 0,875** 0,648** 0,889** 0,630** 0,177 0,408 0,409 0,838** 0,172 0,361 
Switzerland 0,378 0,549* 0,382 0,410 0,515* 0,632** 0,611** 0,303 0,642** 0,260 0,268 0,059 -0,005 0,480 0,490* 0,319 
United 
Kingdom 
0,735** 0,670** 0,834** 0,847** 0,211 0,643** 0,726** 0,966** 0,494* 0,896** -0,216 0,684** 0,915** 0,655** 0,115 0,716** 
United States 0,594* 0,506* 0,684** 0,724** 0,139 0,523* 0,518* 0,901** 0,368 0,869** -0,245 0,750** 0,922** 0,506* 0,129 0,699** 
Euro Area 0,879** 0,738** 0,792** 0,922** 0,683** 0,819** 0,834** 0,799** 0,840** 0,798** -0,093 0,567* 0,669** 0,850** 0,253 0,524* 
OECD 0,753** 0,705** 0,823** 0,885** 0,376 0,744** 0,730** 0,976** 0,584* 0,921** -0,187 0,755** 0,910** 0,680** 0,313 0,761** 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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 Luxembourg Netherlands New  
Zeeland 
Norway Poland Portugal Slovak  
Republic 
Spain Sweden Switzerland United  
Kingdom 
United  
States 
Euro  
Area 
OECD 
Australia 0,494* 0,782** 0,628** 0,368 0,605* 0,744** 0,196 0,899** 0,777** 0,378 0,735** 0,594* 0,879** 0,753** 
Austria 0,680** 0,794** 0,586* 0,509* 0,572* 0,685** 0,043 0,743** 0,732** 0,549* 0,670** 0,506* 0,738** 0,705** 
Belgium 0,694** 0,742** 0,640** 0,347 0,580* 0,855** 0,050 0,880** 0,705** 0,382 0,834** 0,684** 0,792** 0,823** 
Canada 0,656** 0,904** 0,620** 0,461 0,695** 0,749** -0,012 0,897** 0,848** 0,410 0,847** 0,724** 0,922** 0,885** 
Czech 
Republic 
0,085 0,788** 0,197 0,626** 0,361 0,274 0,033 0,420 0,779** 0,515* 0,211 0,139 0,683** 0,376 
Denmark 0,515* 0,804** 0,783** 0,667** 0,742** 0,610** 0,288 0,862** 0,821** 0,632** 0,643** 0,523* 0,819** 0,744** 
Finland 0,622** 0,851** 0,596* 0,604* 0,584* 0,707** -0,003 0,814** 0,875** 0,611** 0,726** 0,518* 0,834** 0,730** 
France 0,853** 0,800** 0,669** 0,245 0,773** 0,829** -0,120 0,845** 0,648** 0,303 0,966** 0,901** 0,799** 0,976** 
Germany 0,458 0,914** 0,215 0,608** 0,571* 0,515* -0,218 0,475 0,889** 0,642** 0,494* 0,368 0,840** 0,584* 
Greece 0,731** 0,745** 0,548* 0,188 0,706** 0,722** -0,155 0,858** 0,630** 0,260 0,896** 0,869** 0,798** 0,921** 
Hungary -0,044 0,132 -0,547* 0,242 -0,123 -0,226 -0,355 -0,403 0,177 0,268 -0,216 -0,245 -0,093 -0,187 
Iceland 0,471 0,461 0,584* 0,144 0,585* 0,417 0,018 0,810** 0,408 0,059 0,684** 0,750** 0,567** 0,755** 
Ireland 0,714** 0,573* 0,659** 0,022 0,636** 0,722** -0,116 0,822** 0,409 -0,005 0,915** 0,922** 0,669** 0,910** 
Italy 0,578* 0,804** 0,249 0,451 0,582* 0,672** -0,080 0,648** 0,838** 0,480 0,655** 0,506* 0,850** 0,680** 
Japan 0,258 0,240 0,596* 0,539* 0,462 0,311 0,338 0,327 0,172 0,490* 0,115 0,129 0,253 0,313 
Korea 0,716** 0,488* 0,600* 0,351 0,678** 0,571* -0,201 0,645** 0,361 0,319 0,716** 0,699** 0,524* 0,761** 
Luxembourg 1,000 0,589* 0,437 0,095 0,747** 0,755** -0,279 0,542* 0,435 0,265 0,888** 0,866** 0,567* 0,872** 
Netherland 0,589* 1,000 0,437 0,557* 0,655** 0,627** -0,173 0,702** 0,907** 0,538* 0,714** 0,600* 0,900** 0,791** 
New Zeeland 0,437 0,437 1,000 0,376 0,538* 0,631** 0,329 0,802** 0,360 0,304 0,557* 0,464 0,555* 0,609** 
Norway 0,095 0,557* 0,376 1,000 0,312 0,097 0,235 0,433 0,712** 0,839** 0,076 -0,067 0,457 0,230 
Poland 0,747** 0,655** 0,538* 0,312 1,000 0,680** -0,022 0,614** 0,579* 0,534* 0,726** 0,733** 0,747** 0,822** 
Portugal 0,755** 0,627** 0,631** 0,097 0,680** 1,000 -0,023 0,684** 0,472 0,244 0,813** 0,704** 0,767** 0,798** 
Slovak 
Republic 
-0,279 -0,173 0,329 0,235 -0,022 -0,023 1,000 0,181 0,061 0,193 -0,276 -0,306 -0,066 -0,186 
Spain 0,542* 0,702** 0,802** 0,433 0,614** 0,684** 0,181 1,000 0,682** 0,366 0,758** 0,651** 0,785** 0,803** 
Sweden 0,435 0,907** 0,360 0,712** 0,579* 0,472 0,061 0,682** 1,000 0,697** 0,548* 0,404 0,830** 0,632** 
Switzerland 0,265 0,538* 0,304 0,839** 0,534* 0,244 0,193 0,366 0,697** 1,000 0,152 0,023 0,470 0,283 
United 
Kingdom 
0,888** 0,714** 0,557* 0,076 0,726** 0,813** -0,276 0,758** 0,548* 0,152 1,000 0,953** 0,740** 0,963** 
United States 0,866** 0,600* 0,464 -0,067 0,733** 0,704** -0,306 0,651** 0,404 0,023 0,953** 1,000 0,628** 0,943** 
Euro Area 0,567* 0,900** 0,555* 0,457 0,747** 0,767** -0,066 0,785** 0,830** 0,470 0,740** 0,628** 1,000 0,808** 
OECD 0,872** 0,791** 0,609** 0,230 0,822** 0,798** -0,186 0,803** 0,632** 0,283 0,963** 0,943** 0,808** 1,000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan 
-3,7 -5,9 -4,5 -5,3 -13,4 -2,9 -6,2 -5,5 -9,7 -9,1 -8,7 -3 -2 -7,4 -4,7 
-2,4 -4,1 -4 -2,8 -3,3 -1,9 -3,5 -4 -3,3 -6,6 -4,6 -1,6 -0,1 -7 -5,1 
-0,7 -2 -2,3 0,2 -3,8 -0,5 -1,3 -3,3 -2,6 -5,9 -6,1 0 1,4 -2,7 -4 
1,6 -2,5 -1 0,1 -5 0 1,6 -2,6 -2,2 -3,8 -7,9 -0,4 2,3 -3,1 -11,2 
2 -2,4 -0,7 1,6 -3,7 1,4 1,6 -1,8 -1,5 -3,1 -5,4 1,1 2,6 -1,8 -7,4 
0,9 -1,9 -0,1 2,9 -3,7 2,3 6,9 -1,5 1,3 -3,7 -3 1,4 4,8 -0,9 -7,6 
-0,1 -0,2 0,4 0,7 -5,6 1,2 5 -1,6 -2,8 -4,4 -4,1 -0,7 0,9 -3,1 -6,3 
1,3 -0,9 -0,2 -0,1 -6,8 0,2 4,1 -3 -3,5 -4,8 -8,9 -2,6 -0,3 -3 -8 
1,8 -1,6 -0,2 -0,1 -6,6 -0,1 2,4 -4,1 -4 -5,7 -7,2 -2,8 0,4 -3,5 -7,9 
1,2 -4,5 -0,4 0,9 -2,9 1,9 2,2 -3,6 -3,8 -7,4 -6,4 0 1,4 -3,6 -6,2 
1,7 -1,7 -2,8 1,5 -3,6 5 2,6 -3 -3,3 -5,3 -7,9 4,9 1,7 -4,4 -6,7 
1,9 -1,4 0,2 1,6 -2,6 5 3,9 -2,3 -1,6 -3,2 -9,4 6,3 3 -3,3 -1,6 
1,8 -0,7 -0,2 1,6 -0,7 4,5 5,2 -2,7 0,2 -4 -5 5,4 0,2 -1,5 -2,5 
1 -0,5 -1,2 0,1 -2 3,4 4,4 -3,4 0 -7,8 -3,7 -13,6 -7,2 -2,7 -2,9 
-4 -4,3 -5,7 -4,8 -5,7 -2,5 -2,3 -8,2 -3,2 -12,7 -4,3 -15,7 -18,2 -5,5 -7,4 
-3,5 -5,5 -5,6 -5,2 -5,6 -5,4 -4,8 -8,6 -5,2 -9,8 -4,1 -10,1 -12,2 -5,4 -8,2 
-2,6 -5,8 -5,2 -4,5 -5 -4 -5,2 -8 -4,6 -10 -3,6 -5,8 -11,6 -5,1 -9,4 
               
               
               
Korea Luxembourg Netherland New Zeeland Norway Poland Portugal 
Slovak 
Republic Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States Euro Area OECD 
3,8 2,4 -9,2 2,8 3,2 -4,4 -5 -3,4 -6,5 -7,3 -2 -5,8 -3,3 -7,6 -4,8 
3,4 1,2 -1,9 2,8 6,3 -4,9 -4,5 -9,9 -4,9 -3,3 -1,8 -4,2 -2,3 -4,3 -3,1 
3,3 3,7 -1,2 1,4 7,6 -4,6 -3,5 -6,3 -3,4 -1,6 -2,8 -2,2 -0,9 -2,7 -1,7 
1,6 3,4 -0,9 0,4 3,3 -4,3 -3,4 -5,3 -3,2 1,2 -1,9 -0,1 0,3 -2,3 -1,9 
2,7 3,4 0,4 0 6 -2,3 -2,8 -7,4 -1,4 1,2 -0,5 0,9 0,7 -1,4 -0,8 
5,4 6 2 1,9 15,4 -3 -3 -12,3 -1 3,7 0,1 3,7 1,5 -0,1 0,2 
4,3 6,1 -0,3 1,8 13,3 -5,1 -4,3 -6,5 -0,7 1,7 -0,1 0,6 -0,6 -4,9 -1,3 
5,1 2,1 -2,1 3,8 9,2 -5 -2,9 -8,2 -0,5 -1,4 -1,2 -2 -4 -2,6 -3,3 
0,5 0,5 -3,2 4 7,3 -6,3 -3 -2,8 -0,2 -1,2 -1,7 -3,7 -5 -3,1 -4,1 
2,7 -1,1 -1,8 4,1 11,1 -5,7 -3,4 -2,4 -0,4 0,6 -1,8 -3,6 -4,4 -3 -3,4 
3,4 0 -0,3 5,2 15,1 -4,1 -6,1 -2,8 1 2 -0,7 -3,3 -3,3 -2,6 -2,7 
3,9 1,3 0,5 5,9 18,5 -3,6 -3,9 -3,5 2 2,4 0,8 -2,7 -2,2 -1,3 -1,3 
4,7 3,7 0,2 5 17,7 -1,9 -2,7 -1,9 1,9 3,8 1,6 -2,7 -2,8 -0,6 -1,3 
3,3 2,5 0,7 3,1 18,8 -3,7 -2,8 -2,3 -4,1 2,5 1,6 -5,3 -6,5 -2 -3,5 
-1,8 -2,3 -4,5 -1,2 9,6 -6,4 -6,7 -5,9 -9,6 -2 -0,7 -12,6 -11,2 -6,1 -8,2 
0,4 -4,3 -5,9 -3,3 9,9 -7,8 -7,6 -6,3 -8,5 -3 -1,3 -13,3 -10,7 -6,7 -8,2 
1,1 -3,6 -5,3 -3,9 10,8 -6,8 -7,8 -5 -7,7 -2 -1,3 -12,5 -9,4 -6,2 -7,6 
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Table – Production factors and GDP evolution during 1990 – 2009 
       
Year GDP 
(100 mil EUR) 
EMPL 
(Population 
outputs) 
(thousand pers.) 
GFCF 
(Gross capital formation) 
(1000 mil EUR) 
1990 44.5 12025 1.557 
1991 39 11965 1.065 
1992 35 11604 1.182 
1993 36 11159 1.280 
1994 37 11099 1.544 
1995 40 10522 1.652 
1996 41 10402 1.745 
1997 39 10005 1.775 
1998 37 9776 1.674 
1999 33 9343 1.593 
2000 40 9572 1.680 
2001 45 9500 1.851 
2002 48 9235 2.004 
2003 53 9223 2.174 
2004 61 9158 2.413 
2005 80 9147 2.720 
2006 98 9313 4.606 
2007 121 9353 9.438 
2008 130 9369 6.370 
2009 121 9115 5.850 
 
 
 
 
